Love and Power: Grau and Pury (2014) as a Case Study in the Challenges of X-Phi Replication by Machery, Edouard et al.
1 23
Review of Philosophy and
Psychology
 
ISSN 1878-5158
 
Rev.Phil.Psych.
DOI 10.1007/s13164-020-00465-x
Love and Power: Grau and Pury (2014)
as a Case Study in the Challenges of X-Phi
Replication
Edouard Machery, Christopher Grau &
Cynthia L. Pury
1 23
Your article is protected by copyright and
all rights are held exclusively by Springer
Nature B.V.. This e-offprint is for personal
use only and shall not be self-archived
in electronic repositories. If you wish to
self-archive your article, please use the
accepted manuscript version for posting on
your own website. You may further deposit
the accepted manuscript version in any
repository, provided it is only made publicly
available 12 months after official publication
or later and provided acknowledgement is
given to the original source of publication
and a link is inserted to the published article
on Springer's website. The link must be
accompanied by the following text: "The final
publication is available at link.springer.com”.
Love and Power: Grau and Pury (2014) as a Case
Study in the Challenges of X-Phi Replication
Edouard Machery1,2 & Christopher Grau3 & Cynthia L. Pury4
# Springer Nature B.V. 2020
Abstract
Grau and Pury (Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 5, 155–168, 2014) reported that
people’s views about love are related to their views about reference. This surprising
effect was however not replicated in Cova et al.’s (in press) replication study. In this
article, we show that the replication failure is probably due to the replication’s low
power and that a metaanalytic reanalysis of the result in Cova et al. suggests that the
effect reported in Grau and Pury is real. We then report a large, highly powered
replication that successfully replicates Grau and Pury 2014. This successful replication
is a case study in the challenges involved in replicating scientific work, and our article
contributes to the discussion of these challenges.
1 Doing Replication Correctly
1.1 Challenges in Conducting Replications
While replications have been rarely published, and probably rarely conducted, for
decades (Makel et al. 2012), for the last seven or eight years psychologists have been
intensely concerned with assessing the replicability of experimental results. This
development has been rich in lessons: First and foremost, we have learned that a
surprisingly large proportion of experimental results, including influential, widely
celebrated experimental results, fail to replicate. But we have also learned a lot about
the challenges and perils of conducting replications. In this section, we elaborate on
these, with a special focus on replications’ power and sample size.
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Replications can fail for many reasons, and, when a replication failure can be
chalked to one of these reasons, little can be learnt from the failure. We will call such
reasons “replication underminers.” While we do not plan to be exhaustive here, the
following replication underminers have turned out to be important:
& Limited generalizability of the original finding: A replication can fail because the
original study and its replication sample from two distinct populations, and because
the effect holds only from the original population (Machery Forthcoming).
& Limited validity of the manipulations: A replication can fail because a manipulation
that was effective in the past or is effective in one population is not effective
anymore when the replication is conducted or is not effective in another
population.1
& Failure of measurement invariance: A replication can fail because measurement is
not invariant across times or populations.
& Insufficient power: A replication can fail because it has insufficient power.
While these replication underminers have all been extensively discussed, the fourth one
is of particular importance for our purposes. If the power of the replication is low, then
the probability that the replication will successfully reject the false null hypothesis is
low even if the original effect was genuine, and a replication failure would not be
informative. Psychologists have naturally been aware of the importance of the power of
replications, and have strived to do highly powered replications. Because the power of
a given test is a function of the sample size, the size of the true effect, and the
significance level, psychologists mostly increase power by increasing the sample size.
Psychologists conducting replication have typically determined the sample size re-
quired to obtain a sufficient power to detect the effect size reported in the original
experiments (e.g., at least .8 in Open Science Collaboration 2015; a .9 power to detect
75% of the original effect in Camerer et al. 2018). The problem with this approach,
however, is that the effect sizes reported in the original experiments are typically
substantially inflated: When experiments are insufficiently powered, statistical signif-
icance is obtained by capitalizing on chance, and the significant effect sizes (the only
ones to be published) are larger than the population effect sizes. As a result, the true
power of the replication is lower, possibly substantially, than the power computed on
the basis of the published effect size.
The large replication efforts conducted over the last few years illustrate the issues
just discussed. Open Science Collaboration (2015) attempted to replicate 100 studies in
cognitive and social psychology. Sample size was determined so as to have at least an
.80 power (with an average of .92) to detect an effect size equal to the one reported in
the original study. Shockingly, only 39% of the studies were successfully replicated
(when successful replication is decided on the basis of statistical significance at the .05
significance level). The effect sizes observed in the replications were almost always
smaller than the effect sizes originally reported. When Camerer et al. (2018) attempted
to replicate the studies published in Science and Nature, they found that slightly more
1 In this case, the effect may exist in both the original population and the population of the replication, but may
not be observed in the replication.
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than 60% of the studies successfully replicated and that the average effect size was only
46.2% of the original average effect size.
The explanation of the apparent low replicability of the studies published in
psychology is no doubt complex: Some of the original studies that failed to replicate
were innocent false positives while others certainly resulted from p-hacking or the
flexibility of data analysis (Simmons et al. 2011). However, some replication failures
probably also resulted from the insufficient power of the replication despite psychol-
ogists’ efforts to run highly powered replications. Etz and Vandekerckhove (2016)
reanalyzed 72 of the 100 replication attempts reported in Open Science Collaboration
(2015). They computed the Bayes factors for the 72 original studies (chosen because of
their univariate data analysis) and their replications. Bayes factors were computed by
contrasting the null model and the information unit prior (a normal distribution centered
at 0 with a standard deviation equal to 1). They found that many of the replications (as
well as many of the original findings) provided little evidence for or against the null
model because replications’ sample sizes are not large enough to undermine the null
model decisively. As they put it (2016, 1), “the apparent failure of the Reproducibility
Project to replicate many target effects can be adequately explained by overestimation
of effect sizes (or overestimation of evidence against the null hypothesis) due to small
sample sizes and publication bias in the psychological literature.”
1.2 Replication and Meta-Analytic Estimates
It has long been known that low powered literatures can create apparent inconsis-
tencies: Some studies may report significant results by sheer chance, while others may
fail to obtain significant results because of their low power (e.g., Schmidt 1996, 2010).
Counting only the number of significant and non-significant results would thus suggest
disagreement among studies that may in reality substantially agree: Their effect sizes
may be comparable (although some may be significant, while others wouldn’t) or they
may at least be in the same direction.
To prevent being misled by the appearance of disagreement among studies due to
low power, meta-analysts have suggested aggregating their results by means of
metanalytic tools: Instead of counting the number of significant and non-significant
results, meta-analysts propose, scientists ought to estimate the population effect size by
aggregating data across studies. Failed replications that may seem to undermine the
original results may in fact provide further support for their veracity. Schmidt (1996)
gives the following startling example of 21 studies examining whether a single-item
test predicts job performance. Because of the small sample size of each study, only 8 of
them results in a significant correlation: The literature seems ripe with disagreement
and the predictive validity of this single-item test is dubious. However, all the corre-
lations are positive, and in this sense the studies agree. A meta-analytic aggregation of
the correlation coefficients shows indeed that there is a genuine correlation between the
single-item test and job performance.
Metaanalysts’ observation about low powered scientific literatures and their meta-
analytic recommendation should be extended to the contemporary debate about the
replicability of psychology. If replications are insufficiently powered—a not uncom-
mon situation if the re-analysis of OSC 2015 by Etz and Vandekerckhove (2016) is on
the right track—determining replication success and assessing replicability by means of
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statistical significance may be misleading, and a meta-analytic approach may be a
necessary corrective.
2 Assessing the Replicability of Experimental Philosophy: Perils
and Challenges
2.1 The X-Phi Replicability Project
Inspired by Open Science Collaboration (2015), Cova and colleagues (in press)
attempted to assess the replicability of experimental philosophy. They selected 40
studies chosen as follows: “For each year between 2003 and 2015 (included), three
papers were selected: one as the most cited paper for this year, and two at random
(except for 2003, for which only two papers were available).” Two studies were added
for a total of 40 studies. Sample size was determined so as to obtain a .95 power to
detect the effect reported in the original studies (although the final average power was
.88). Surprisingly, a larger proportion of studies replicated than in similar projects in
psychology: 78% of these articles successfully replicated, as assessed by the signifi-
cance criterion (Fig. 1). In addition, the average effect size for the replications was
similar to the average effect size in the original studies.
Additional analyses examined which type of study is less likely to replicate. Cova
et al. (in press) compared the papers reporting demographic effects and context effects
to the papers reporting “content effects” (i.e., studies investigating how judgments vary
when the content of the vignettes is changed), and argue that the former are less likely
to replicate (our emphasis): “At least within our sample, effects of the second kind
(content-based) are less fragile than effects of the third (context-based) and fourth
(demographic effects) kinds.”
This secondary analysis is philosophically significant. The negative program of
experimental philosophy, which uses experimental-philosophy results to undermine
the use of cases in philosophy, appeals primarily to studies reporting demographic and
context effects (Machery 2017). If these studies are not trustworthy, the empirical basis
of the negative program crumbles, and critics of the method of cases in philosophy are
left without an argument.
2.2 Grau and Pury (2014)
In “Attitudes Towards Reference and Replaceability” (2014) Grau and Pury described
the results of their study comparing people’s intuitions concerning the linguistic
reference of proper names with attitudes regarding the replacement of original entities
with potential duplicates (including potential duplicates of loved ones). Grau and Pury’s
study was inspired by Robert Kraut’s (1986) essay “Love De Re,” which proposed an
analogy between the nature of the bond lovers often form to those they love and the
manner in which many linguistic terms (particularly proper names) refer. Several
philosophers have noted that love often seems to involve an historic tie to an individual
such that the love can survive changes in the qualities of the beloved and is not
necessarily proportional to any such changes (Nozick 1974): The beloved is taken to
be, in important sense, irreplaceable. Kraut proposed a parallel between this sort of
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“rigid” attachment in love and the manner which proper names “rigidly designate”, i.e.
Saul Kripke’s contention that proper names attach to objects in an historical manner
such that reference cannot not switch to an even exactly similar object (Kripke 1980).
Kraut summarized his analogy as follows (Kraut 1986, 427):
It is usually agreed that Lisa’s history and origin are essential to her. If so, a name
that uniquely refers to Lisa is not properly applicable to any possible object with a
history and origin different from Lisa’s. And, analogously, a love that is genu-
inely directed toward Lisa does not get directed toward any object with a history
Fig. 1 Results of the 40 Replications in Cova et al. in press (from Cova et al. in press)
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and origin different from hers. It is that that confers upon love the property of
being directed toward Lisa. And it is that that makes love, at least love of
individual persons, historical.
While Kraut wrote as though Kripkean rigid designation is simply the true theory of
reference, empirical work on the issue suggests that individuals vary in the degree to
which they hold a Kripkean view (that names rigidly refer in virtue of a particular
causal history) or alternatively a “descriptivist” view by which a cluster of properties
attributed to a name determines its referent (this is sometimes explained in terms of a
“description” that uniquely picks out the object to which a name refers) (e.g., Machery
et al. 2004; Machery et al. 2009; Machery et al., 2010; Machery et al. 2015; Sytsma
et al. 2015; Beebe and Undercoffer 2015, 2016). With this variation in mind, Grau and
Pury examined whether people’s attitudes regarding reference correspond to attitudes
regarding replaceability. In their original study, 162 participants completed an online
questionnaire asking them to consider how appropriate it would be to feel the same way
about a perfect replica of a loved one, as well as other related questions about
replaceability, and a series of questions regarding reference (using the Gödel/Schmidt
scenario utilized by Machery and others). The results appeared to provide support for
Grau and Pury’s key hypothesis that “participants who endorse a Kripkean, rather than
a Descriptivist view of linguistic reference should report that it is less appropriate to feel
the same way toward a replaced loved one” (Grau and Pury 2014, 160). Participants
who previously had endorsed Kripkean reference (n = 96) rated loved ones as less
replaceable on two different measures than participants who had previously endorsed
Descriptivist reference (n = 66, t(160) ≥ 2.27, p ≤ 0.02, η2 ≥ 0.03; Table 1).
2.3 The Failed Replication of Grau and Pury
Grau and Pury (2014) was one of the 40 studies replicated by Cova et al. (in press). The
replication was conducted by Vilius Dranseika and Renatas Berniūnas (https://osf.
io/xrhqe/). As instructed by the leaders of the x-phi replication study, they computed
Table 1 Ratings by Descriptivists (n = 66) and Kripkeans (n = 96) of the Liklihood and Normative Appro-
priateness of the Participant Feeling the Same Way About a Duplicate
Duplicated Target Linguistic Reference Likelihood Rating Normative Appropriateness
Rating
m sd t(160) p eta2 m sd t(160) p eta2
Loved One Descriptivist 3.1 2.2 2.27 .02 .031 3.3 2.2 2.58 .01 .040
Kripkean 2.4 1.8 2.5 2.0
Pet Descriptivist 3.3 2.2 2.17 .03 .029 3.8 2.1 2.21 .03 .030
Kripkean 2.7 1.9 3.0 2.1
Acquiantance Descriptivist 4.7 1.9 1.03 .31 .007 4.4 2.1 1.25 .21 .010
Kripkean 4.3 2.0 4.0 2.0
Shoes Descriptivist 5.3 1.7 1.13 .26 .008 5.7 1.5 1.52 .13 .014
Kripkean 4.9 2.0 5.3 1.9
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the sample size required to get a power equal to .95 given the effect reported in the
original study, and they found that they needed 383 participants. They recruited 405
participants in Lithuania, from which 18 were excluded, for a final sample size of 387
participants. Dranseika and Berniūnas compared the ratings of normative appropriate-
ness of the participant feeling the same way about a duplicate of the loved one by
Descriptivists (n = 287) and Kripkeans (n = 100), and they failed to find a difference
between them at the .05 level (t(385) = 1.69, p = .092, d = .196). Their conclusion was
as follows: “We did not succeed in replicating the original results (p = 0.092) in
Lithuanian language in a sample of Lithuanian students.” Dranseika and Berniūnas’s
findings were reported in Cova et al. (in press).
Dranseika and Berniūnas also conducted a follow-up study that used a modified version
of the Gödel case with two different questions in order to identify Descriptivists and
Kripkeans (also available at https://osf.io/xrhqe/). The first question follows the first
replication and Grau and Pury (2014). They recruited 216 participants in Lithuania, from
which 8 were excluded, for a final sample size of 208 participants. Dranseika and Berniūnas
compared again the ratings of normative appropriateness of the participant feeling the same
way about a duplicate of the loved one by Descriptivists (n= 140) and Kripkeans (n= 68),
and they failed to find a difference between them at the .05 level for both ways of identifying
Descriptivists and Kripkeans (first way: Descriptivists (n = 140) and Kripkeans (n = 68);
t(206) = 1.69, p = .103, d = .242; second way: Descriptivists (n= 53) and Kripkeans (n =
155); t(206) = .172, p = .864, d = .027).
2.4 Challenges to the Replication of Grau and Pury
As we noted in Section 1, failed replications are not always informative, as happens when
participants are sampled from another population and the effect is expected to only hold in
the original population or when the power of a replication is low. Furthermore, when the
power of a replication is low, replication success can be usefully analyzed by computing a
meta-analytic estimate of the population effect size. Concerns about power apply straight-
forwardly to the failed replication of Grau and Pury.2 First, the power of the replication of
Grau and Pury is low for many possible effect sizes. If the effect size is equal to d = .2 (a
small effect size according to Cohen’s (1992) classification), for instance, the power of the
experiment is only .4 (computer using G*Power 3.0, Faul et al. 2007): That is, if the null
hypothesis is true, the probability of rejecting it is only 40%.3 If so, one is more likely to get
at the truth, if the null hypothesis is true, by throwing a coin! Figure 2 reports the power
curve of the replication of Grau and Pury for effect sizes between 0 and .4 (the effect size
reported in Grau and Pury (2014) that was used to determine the sample size of the
replication). In light of the low power for many possible effect sizes, we should refrain
from interpreting the replication failure as indicating that Grau and Pury’s results are false
positives.
Second, while the effect reported is not significant at the .05 level, it is in the expected
direction (see Fig. 1): It does not reach significance because the effect observed in the
2 Other aspects of the replication might explain the different results (on the importance of these considerations,
see Trafimow and Earp 2016): For instance, the vignettes were translated and the participants were from a
different country.
3 The power of the follow-up study is even lower.
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replication is substantially smaller than the effect originally reported, a common situation
as we have seen. Thus, instead of assessing replicability by means of statistical signifi-
cance, it is better to compute the meta-analytic estimate, combining the original and
replication results.4 We did not include the follow up study by Dranseika and Berniūnas
since it is not an exact replication, but the results of their first analysis are in line with the
metaanalytic estimate. The original effect size is dO = .381, the replication effect size is
dR = .196.
5 Following a fixed effects metanalytic approach, we computed a weighted r for
the original study and its replication (Goh et al. 2016): rA = .126 (95%CI = [.042; .208]) or
equivalently dA = .254. The average effect size is significantly different from zero.
Far from suggesting that Grau and Pury’s (2014) results do not replicate, the
replication failure is more plausibly viewed as resulting from the low power, and, if
anything, aggregating the two studies suggests that the effect is genuine. However, the
conclusions of meta-analyses can be undermined by questionable research practices in
the meta-analyzed studies (Nelson et al. 2018). To confirm the conclusion of our meta-
analysis, we decided to go beyond this reanalysis of the data reported by Cova et al. by
conducting a genuinely highly powered replication of Grau and Pury (2014).
3 Replication of Grau and Pury
3.1 Methods
Participants were recruited on Amazon Turk, and paid $.33 for their participation in this
study. The study was preregistered on OSF (https://osf.io/h32zd) and approved by the
IRB of the University of Pittsburgh.6 The data can be accessed at the OSF link. To
obtain a power of .8 assuming a small effect size d = .2, an alpha of .05, and an equal
distribution between the two conditions, we determined that a sample size of 394 per
condition was needed. Assuming that 15% of participants on Amazon Turk fail the
attention and comprehension check, we estimated that our sample size should be at
least 905. Assuming a 2 to 1 ratio between Kripkeans and Descriptivists on the basis of
past results, we determined that 295 Descriptivists and 591 Kripkeans were needed.
Assuming again a 15% failure rate, our total sample size should be 1018.
1018 participants started the survey; 843 completed it; 738 passed attention checks
(see below), with 715 of those also indicating they were fluent in English, answering all
of the relevant study questions, and stating that they had not participated in a similar
study in the past.
Of the 715 participants, 56% (n = 397) indicated they were female and 44% (n =
318) indicated they were male. All were either American or residing in the United
States. Reported highest educational attainment was high school (n = 98, or 14%), some
college (n = 171, or 24%), college degree (n = 326, or 46%), grad or master’s degree
4 Meta-analyses are often done on many studies, but can also be done on a few, indeed a couple of studies
(Goh et al. 2016).
5 dO differs from the effect size reported in Grau and Pury 2014 (η2 = .4 corresponding to d = .408) and used in
the replication of Grau and Pury to compute the desired sample size and to assess whether the observed effect
size of the replication was included in the confidence interval of the original study.
6 Unfortunately, preregistration only included the materials used in the experiment, but not the sample size and
exclusion criteria.
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(n = 105, or 15%) and PhD (n = 15, or 2%). Age ranged from 19 to 81, with a mean age
of 37.8 (sd = 12.1). Approximately half of participants (n = 363, or 51%) had taken at
least one philosophy class, while 352 (49%) had not. Of those who had taken at least
one course, only 54 (15%) had taken more than one or two courses; therefore, for the
purposes of this study participant responses will be analyzed based on some philosophy
coursework (n = 363) versus no philosophy coursework (n = 352).
3.2 Materials and Procedure
We used an online survey replicating Grau and Pury’s (2014) questionnaires with
additional attention check items built in. One attention check item directed participants
to answer two questions in a particular way (e.g., “[P] lease copy and paste the words ‘I
have read the instructions’ (with the quotation marks) in the box labelled ‘Any
comments or questions?’”), and an additional attention check item verified that partic-
ipants had read the content of the Gödel question. The text read “John is quite good at
mathematics, and he can accurately describe the content of the incompleteness theo-
rem”; The question then asked whether John can or cannot describe the content of the
incompleteness theorem.
As in Grau and Pury (2014), participants were classified as either Kripkean or
Descriptivist based on their answer to Machery et al.‘s (2004) Gödel question:
Suppose that John has been told in college that Gödel is the man who proved an
important mathematical theorem, called “the incompleteness of arithmetic.” John
is quite good at mathematics, and he can accurately describe the content of the
incompleteness theorem. He attributes this theorem to Gödel as the discoverer.
But this is the only thing that he has heard about Gödel. Now suppose that Gödel
was not the author of this theorem. A man called “Schmidt,” whose body was
Fig. 2 Power of the Replication of Grau and Pury (2014) for Various Effect Sizes
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found in Vienna under mysterious circumstances many years ago, actually did the
work in question. His friend Gödel somehow got hold of the manuscript and
claimed credit for the work, which was thereafter attributed to Gödel. Thus,
Gödel has been known as the man who proved the incompleteness of arithmetic.
Most people who have heard the name “Gödel” are like John; the claim that
Gödel discovered the incompleteness theorem is the only thing they have ever
heard about Gödel.
They were then asked to answer the following question:
When John uses the name ‘Gödel’, is he talking about:
(A) the person who really discovered the incompleteness of arithmetic? or.
(B) the person who got hold of the manuscript and claimed credit for the work?
For analysis, participants answering A were classified as Descriptivist; participants
answering B classified as Kripkean.
Participants then completed replaceability questions for the same targets as Grau and
Pury (2014): an unspecified pair of shoes, a favorite pair of shoes, a pair of shoes that
were a gift from a friend, a pet one is fond of, a (human) loved one, and a person with
whom one has a purely transactional relationship. Unlike Grau and Pury, all partici-
pants answered questions about all targets, including all types of shoes.7 Questions
about feelings toward the replacement were the same, including the target questions
about the Likelihood (“On a scale from 1 to 7, with (1) being ‘not at all likely’ and (7)
being ‘extremely likely’, how likely would you be to feel the same way about [the
target] as you felt about the original?”) and Appropriateness (“On a scale from 1 to 7,
with (1) being ‘not at all appropriate’ and (7) being ‘extremely appropriate’, how
appropriate would it be to feel the same way about [the target]?”). The question about
a replaced pet also was followed with the question: “On a scale from 1 to 7, with (1)
being ‘I strongly disagree’ and (7) being ‘I strongly agree’, to what extent do you agree
with the claim ‘A pet is like a member of the family’”? Additional questions, not
analyzed here, were identical to Grau and Pury and asked about the likelihood and
appropriateness of the pet and replaced people feeling the same way about the
participant, and about confidence that replicants were identical to the original.
To ensure comparability between results, all effect sizes were translated into the
equivalent Cohen’s d using the spreadsheet developed by DeCoster (2012) and avail-
able at http://www.stat-help.com/spreadsheets/Converting%20effect%20
sizes%202012-06-19.xls
3.3 Results
Kripkean Versus Descriptivist Classification: Overall, 65% (n = 463) of participants
selected the Kripkean answer to the Gödel question, while 35% (n = 252) selected the
Descriptivist answer. As in Grau and Pury (2014), Kripkeans were slightly older (mean
age = 38.6, sd = 12.2) than Descriptivists (mean age = 36.4, sd = 11.8, t(713) = 2.34,
p = .02, d = 0.18); Kripkeans and descriptivists did not differ significantly in terms of
gender (χ2 = 0.382, p = .54), having taken at least one philosophy course (χ2 < .001),
or believing a pet is like a member of the family (t(713) = .36, p = .72, d = .03).
7 This difference was introduced in order to maximize power while keeping the sample size manageable.
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Kripkean Versus Descriptivist Linguistic Reference: Table 2 presents the ratings of
Likelihood and Normative Appropriateness of feeling the same way about a duplicate
by Linguistic Reference for each of the duplicate targets. The effect of Linguistic
Reference on both ratings of replacement of a loved one replicated the effect reported
in Grau and Pury (2014), with Kripkeans making significantly lower ratings than
Descriptivists in the likelihood and the appropriateness of responding to the replaced
loved one in the same way as the original. These effect sizes (d = .26 and d = .20,
respectively) were similar to those found in the Cova et al. (in press) replication of the
original study. While there was a trend for a similar difference in the likelihood of the
same response to a pet, it did not reach statistical significance. No other differences
were found in the Likelihood or Appropriateness ratings.
Using age and philosophy training as covariates, the relationship between Linguistic
Reference and both Likelihood and Appropriateness ratings for a Loved One remained
significant (F(1,711) = 30.28, p = .002, η2 = 0.013 for Likelihood, and F(1,711) = 5.34,
p = .02, η2 = 0.007 for Appropriateness). Those effect sizes translate to Cohen’s d
values of .23 and .17, respectively, similar to the effect sizes found without the added
covariates.
Further analyses that follow the analyses in Grau and Pury, but are tangential to the
replication of the effect of interest are reported in the Appendix.
4 Discussion
4.1 Love and Reference
In contrast to the conclusion drawn by Cova et al. (in press), but in line with the
metaanalysis reported in Section 2, we were able to replicate successfully the main
finding in Grau and Pury (2014): As predicted, people who have descriptivist
leanings, as measured by their judgment about the reference of “Gödel” in the
Gödel case, are more likely to feel the same way about the identical duplicate of a
lover as they felt about the original lover and they are also more likely to judge it
appropriate to do so.
One may object that whether or not we were able to replicate the main finding in
Grau and Pury (2014) successfully depends on how success is defined. Because the
effect size we observed is much smaller than the effect size reported by Grau and Pury,
a critic may insist that our result differs substantially from the main finding in Grau and
Pury (2014), as did the one reported in Cova et al.
Replication success can be assessed by different criteria, including whether the
replication is statistically significant, whether the confidence interval around the repli-
cation’s effect size includes the original effect size, and whether the confidence interval
around the original study’s effect size includes the replication effect size. So which
criterion should be used here? First, we simply relied on the main criterion used in
Cova et al. (in press), namely significance. Second, which criterion is appropriate
depends on the question of interest: If what matters is the effect size, then replication
success should be assessed on the basis of confidence intervals; if what matters is the
mere existence of a causal relation or of a correlation, then replication success should
be assessed on the basis of significance. Grau and Pury were only assessing whether
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there was a relation between one’s views about love and about reference, and had no
hypothesis about effect size. For this reason, significance is a more appropriate criterion
for assessing replication success.
In line with Section 2, we report a metanalytic estimate of the effect size,
aggregating over the three existing studies (Grau and Pury 2014; Cova et al., in
press; and the present study). Following a fixed effects metanalytic approach,
we compute a weighted r for these three studies (Goh et al. 2016): rA = .116
(95%CI = [.061; .170]) or equivalently dA = .234. The average effect size is
significantly different zero.
While the effect is small according to Cohen (1992), it is real, and extremely
striking: it reveals a surprising connection between two apparently disparate
domains—what people understand proper names to refer to and their attitude toward
the object of their love. People who associate proper names with individuals histori-
cally, and thus independently of their characteristics, are more likely to view love as
anchored to individuals, independently of what those are like. So to speak, they value a
connection to individuals, not to what these individuals are like, and this either when it
comes to love or to the interpretation of proper names.
4.2 Lessons about Replication: The Importance of Power and Metaanalysis
Our findings show the importance of interpreting failed replications, such as the failed
replication of Grau and Pury (2014) reported in Cova et al., carefully. A failed
replication is silent about the veridicality of the original effect when it has a low power
for a range of plausible effect sizes: Such low power is a replication underminer. Cova
et al. were thus too quick to raise doubts about the reality of the effect reported in Grau
and Pury.
Table 2 Ratings by Kripkeans (n = 463) and Descriptivists (n = 252) of the Likelihood and Normative
Appropriateness of the participant feeling the same way about a duplicate
Duplicate Target Likelihood Rating Appropriateness Rating
Linguistic Reference m sd t (713) p d m sd t (713) p d
Loved One Kripkean 2.5 1.7 3.41 <.01 .26 2.6 1.8 2.61 .01 .20
Descriptivist 2.9 1.9 3.0 1.9
Pet Kripkean 3.0 1.8 1.75 .08 .14 3.2 1.9 1.27 .20 .10
Descriptivist 3.3 1.8 3.3 1.9
Acquaintance Kripkean 4.0 2.0 1.28 .20 .10 3.9 2.0 0.60 .55 .05
Descriptivist 4.2 2.0 4.0 2.0
Shoes (Unspecified) Kripkean 4.7 1.7 .66 .51 .05 5.2 1.6 −0.84 .40 .07
Descriptivist 4.8 1.7 5.1 1.5
Shoes (Favorite) Kripkean 4.5 1.8 .09 .93 0.01 4.8 1.8 .32 .75 .02
Descriptivist 4.5 1.8 4.9 1.7
Shoes (Gift) Kripkean 4.3 1.8 .63 .53 .05 4.6 1.8 −.75 .45 .06
Descriptivist 4.4 1.8 4.5 1.8
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How should future replications address this first concern? We recommend two
strategies.8 First, when replicating a study, scientists could focus on the smallest effect
size of theoretical interest instead of the effect size reported in the original study. On the
basis of the smallest effect size of theoretical interest, scientists would then determine
the required sample size to have the desired power. We recommend a power at least
equal to .8 when the sample size is planned this way. We followed this strategy in this
paper, using the effect size observed in the failed replication as a way to identify on the
smallest effect size of theoretical interest. There are two limitations with this approach.
First, it is often unclear what the smallest effect size of theoretical interest is. Second,
when the smallest effect size of theoretical interest is small, a very large sample size is
needed for power to be large enough. (Incidentally, this is why we suggested to set the
target power at .8 rather than .9 or .95.)
Alternatively, a two-step procedure can be followed. First, the sample size is
determined so as to have a 90% power to detect 75% of the original effect size (alpha
at .05). We propose computing the sample size on the basis of 75% of the original effect
size to take the inflation of effect size due to low power. No further data is collected if
the replication is successful. Second, if the replication is not successful, a follow up
replication is run with a sample size set so as to have a 90% power to detect the
metaanalytic estimate of the population effect size resulting from the original study and
the failed replication.
One may worry that this will make replication efforts at the very least extremely
challenging, if not practically impossible. We concede that some experiments may
require less stringent requirements given the difficulties involved in collecting data.
However, when data are collected on line with on-line pools of participants, much
larger sample sizes are perfectly doable, although undoubtedly costly.
Our findings also show the limitations of significance as a way of assessing
replication success, particularly when power is low: A failed replication may in fact
support the reality of the original effect rather than undermine it. A metaanalytic
approach, of the type followed in this article, goes beyond counting positive and
negative results: It can reveal that results that seem to speak against one another are
in fact consistent. We have argued that the results reported in Cova et al. are indeed
consistent with the results of Grau and Pury (2014), and our large replication confirms
this claim. While it is beyond the scope of this paper to argue for a particular definition
of replication success, we would recommend a pluralistic approach, taking into account
several criteria (as was done by Open Science Collaboration 2015).
4.3 Demographic Effects and the Negative Program of Experimental Philosophy
Finally, our findings bear on the proper interpretation of the demographic and context
effects in experimental philosophy. Cova et al. attempted to replicate four demographic
effects:
– Machery et al. 2004: People in the USA and in East Asia tend to respond
differently to the Gödel case.
– Nadelhoffer et al. 2009: Extraversion does not predict compatibilist judgments.
8 A third strategy is followed by Camerer et al. (2018).
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– Sytsma and Machery 2010: philosophers and lay people tend to assign conscious
experiences differently.
– Grau and Pury 2014: Kripkeans and Descriptivists tend to understand love
differently.
Of those four studies only one—Sytsma and Machery (2010)—successfully replicated.
These results need to be scrutinized closely, however, before drawing any conclu-
sion about the fragility of demographic effects. The failed replication of Machery et al.
(2004) is an outlier in a series of successful replications (Machery 2017, Chapter 2),
and a recent metaanalysis strongly suggests that judgments elicited by the Gödel case
do vary across cultures (van Dongen et al. n.d.). Nadelhoffer et al. claimed, against
Feltz and Cokely (2009), that extraversion does not predict compatibilist judgments:
The failed replication confirmed Feltz and Cokely’s original results that people do have
different intuitions about free will depending on their personality (a point incidentally
acknowledged in a footnote by Cova et al.). Feltz and Cokely (2019) also meta-analyze
17 published and 8 unpublished studies (for a total n = 2811), and confirm the
robustness of this correlation. Using a very large sample (n = 5268), Hannikainen
et al. (2019) have provided further evidence that extraversion correlates with
compatibilism. Finally, we have just shown that Grau and Pury (2014) replicates just
fine if the replication is sufficiently powered. We are thus led to a very different
conclusion than Cova et al.: Far from showing that demographic effects are “fragile”
(Cova et al., in press), the total evidence in fact shows the robustness of experimental
philosophers’ results reporting demographic variation.
This conclusion is of extreme importance for experimental philosophy: The negative
program of experimental philosophy is built on the existence of demographic and
context effects (Weinberg, 2007; Machery 2017). Recently, these effects have come
under serious attack (Nagel 2012; Knobe 2019), but a closer look at the actual empirical
evidence shows that this attack utterly fails (for further discussion, see Stich 2013; Stich
et al. n.d.; Knobe n.d.): Demographic results are often robust, and their alleged fragility
is often merely due to hasty conclusions.
5 Conclusion
Grau and Pury (2014) reported an extremely surprising effect: People’s understanding
of love is associated with how they assign reference to proper names. This suggests that
people vary in how they value “bare individuals,” i.e., individuals independently of
what they are like, and this varying valuation manifests itself in domains as disparate as
proper names interpretation and love. The reality of this surprising effect was chal-
lenged by the failed replication reported in Cova et al. (in press). We have however
shown that this replication was underpowered for many plausible effect sizes, and that a
metanalytic estimate confirmed the reality of the effect reported in Grau and Pury
(2014). Going beyond this reanalysis, we conducted our own, highly powered replica-
tion, and showed the reality of the effect. This successful replication confirms Grau and
Pury’s (2014) claim. It also highlights the importance of a careful interpretation of
failed replications as well as the robustness of demographic effects in experimental
philosophy.
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Appendix
In this appendix we report a series of analysis of the data collected in our paper that
extends the analyses done in Grau and Pury (2014).
Type of Replicant: Paralleling Grau and Pury (2014), the effect of type of replicant
was tested with a 2 (Love for Replicant: Loved One and Pet versus Acquaintance and
Shoes [Unspecified]) × 2 (Humanness of Replicant: Loved One and Acquaintance
versus Pet and Shoes) × 2 (Measure of Replaceability: Appropriateness versus Likeli-
hood) repeated measures ANOVA (Table 3). Note that, as in Grau and Pury, Love had
the strongest effect (equivalent to d = 2.02, with loved targets (marginal mean = 2.93,
sd = .06) rated as less replaceable than nonloved targets (marginal mean = 4.48, sd =
.05). This was followed by a strong effect for Humanness (equivalent to d = 1.15) –
again, with human targets (marginal mean = 3.34, sd = .06), rated as less replaceable
than nonhuman targets (marginal mean = 4.06, sd = .05), modified by other smaller
effects and interactions. The same pattern and approximate effect sizes remained when
Linguistic Reference was added as a between participants variable. Thus, as in Grau
and Pury, loved and humanness strongly predicted replaceability.
Sentimentality Unlike in Grau and Pury (2014), all participants were asked about the
replaceability of a pair of shoes that were a gift from a friend (High Sentiment) and a
favorite pair (Low Sentiment). Thus, we were able to test the results with a 2
(Sentiment: High versus Low) × 2 (Measure of Replaceability: Appropriateness versus
Likelihood) repeated measures ANOVA. We found significant main effects of both
Sentiment (F(1,714) = 12.00, p = .001, η2 = .017, equivalent d = .26) and Measure
(F(1,714) = 45.32, p < .001, η2 = .060, equivalent to d = .51) that were modified by a
significant interaction of Sentiment and Measure (F(1,714) = 13.37, p = .02, η2 = .018,
equivalent d = .27). Participants gave their highest ratings for the appropriateness of
feeling the same way about their favorite shoes (m = 4.8, sd = 1.7), next for the
appropriateness of feeling the same way about gift shoes (m = 4.6, sd = 1.8), then the
likelihood of feeling the same way about their favorite shoes (m = 4.5, sd = 1.8), with
the lowest ratings made for the likelihood of feeling the same way about gift shoes
(m = 4.4, sd = 1.8). Means for the same type of shoes differed significantly based on
Measurement (minimum t(714) = 4.04, p < .001). While participants rated it as more
appropriate to feel the same way about replaced favorite shoes compared to gift shoes
Table 3 Within Participants ANOVA results for two Type of Replicant Effects (Loved and Humanness),
Measure, and their interactions
Effect F(1, 714) p η2
Love 726.37 0.00 0.504
Humanness 237.42 0.00 0.250
Measure 22.26 0.00 0.030
Love x Humanness 29.89 0.00 0.040
Love x Measure 2.08 0.15 0.003
Humanness x Measure 27.46 0.00 0.037
Love x Humanness x Measure 28.20 0.00 0.038
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(t(714) = 4.84, p < .001), there was no significant difference between the likelihood of
feeling the same way about the different pairs (t(714) = 1.49, p = .138). These findings
paralleled the between-participant findings of Grau and Pury, finding an effect of
sentiment for objects on appropriateness but not likelihood ratings.
Sentimentality for pets was tested by correlating the belief that a pet is like a member
of the family with likelihood of feeling the same way about a replaced pet (r = −.14,
p < .001, r2 = .018, equivalent d = 0.27) and appropriateness of feeling the same way
about that replacement (r = −.12, p = .002, r2 = .014, equivalent d = .24). These effects
were smaller than in Grau and Pury (2014)‘s correlations of −.22 and − .21, respec-
tively, but still statistically significant and in the same direction.
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